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The effect of agency cost on corporate performance has been long interest to 
financiers, economists, legal practitioners and business operators. But there is no 
study in this relationship focuses on the manufacturing companies especially in 
Malaysia. Therefore, this study aims to investigate the relationship between 
agency cost and corporate performance among manufacturing companies in 
Malaysia. Agency cost are measured by five independent variables namely 
leverage, size, growth, expense and efficiency. While corporate performance is 
measured by Return on Equity (ROE). This study used secondary data from 
public listed manufacturing companies listed in Bursa Malaysia. From total 
population of 457 manufacturing companies listed in Bursa Malaysia, 130 (28%) 
firms for sample was taken covering over period of 5 years from 2012 to 2016. 
The relationship between agency cost and corporate performance in this study is 
analyzed by performing regression analysis of panel data. The results show that 
three out of five proxy of agency cost are significantly related to corporate 
performance which measured by ROE. The three variables that are significantly 
related with Return on Equity (ROE) are efficiency, leverage and size. The other 
two variables that are found not significant related with corporate performance 
(ROE) which are company growth and expense. Hence the study found that 
agency cost to be significantly related with corporate performance. 
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Kesan kos agensi kepada prestasi korporat telah lama menjadi tarikan kepada 
pembiaya, ahli ekonomi, pengamal undang-undang dan pengendali perniagaan. 
Tetapi masih lagi tiada kajian dalam hubungan ini yang fokus pada syarikat 
perkilangan terutamanya di Malaysia. Oleh itu, kajian ini bertujuan untuk 
menyiasat hubungan antara kos agensi dan prestasi korporat dikalangan syarikat 
perkilangan di Malaysia. Kos agensi diukur oleh lima pembolehubah bebas iaitu 
leveraj, saiz, pertumbuhan, perbelanjaan dan kecekapan. Manakala, prestasi 
korporat diukur oleh Pulangan atas Ekuiti (ROE). Kajian ini menggunakan data 
sekunder dari syarikat perkilangan yang tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia. Dari 
populasi 457 syarikat perkilangan yang tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia, 130 (28%) 
sampel telah diambil meliputi tempoh 5 tahun dari 2012 hingga 2016. Hubungan 
antara kos agensi and prestasi korporat dalam kajian ini dianalisis dengan 
melakukan analisis regresi data panel. Keputusan menunjukkan tiga dari lima 
proksi agensi kos ketara berkaitan dengan prestasi korporat yang diukur dengan 
ROE. Tiga pembolehubah tersebut yang ketara berkaitan dengan Pulangan atas 
Ekuiti (ROE) adalah kecekapan, leveraj dan saiz. Dua pembolehubah yang lain 
didapati tidak ketara berkaitan dengan prestasi koporat iaitu pertumbuhan 
syarikat dan perbelanjaan. Oleh itu, kajian ini menunjukkan kos agensi adalah 
ketara berkaitan dengan prestasi korporat. 
 
Kata kunci: kos agensi, prestasi korporat, keuntungan syarikat, leveraj, saiz, 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
A good corporate governance is important for the economy of a country (Olivera 
et al., 2016), especially so if it wants to participate in the global capital markets, 
especially in inducing foreign long-term capital and direct investments. The 
direct investments also include knowledge transfer, new technologies, 
professional skills, and others. In general, investors have to be wary of a 
country’s corporate governance structure, especially on its integrity and 
conformance to international standards of transparency and accountability.  
 
According to Olivera et al. (2016), the corporate governance policy of a country 
can significantly influence the investment and financing. As such, the corporate 
governance mechanism has to scrutinize the efficiency of the management 
allocating the resources in firms.  In general, capital needs to be channeled to 
profitable companies with good corporate governance due to the overall 
insufficiency in domestic savings, and therefore, corporate governance serves as 
an effective and objective means to control management in companies and also 
contributes to efficient allocation of financial resources, which facilitates 
financial market functions that can further spur the economic development. 
 
In addition, Olivera et al. (2016) also pointed out that there are many 
mechanisms involved in implementing good corporate governance in a company. 
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One of them is the representation of the boards of directors on behalf of 
shareholders to monitor the management effectively. It is imperative to have 
powerful and systematized board of directors so that it can effectively monitor 
the management in carrying out their duties to attain the strategic goals of the 
company. In addition, the compensation management such as bonus is also 
commonly used internally to ensure management acts not for self-interest but to 
increase shareholders’ wealth. Management compensation is typically in the 
form of monetary amount such as salary and bonus that are determined based on 
job performance, as well as in the form of stocks of the company. The 
compensation in the form of firm’s shares of the company may improve the 
alignment of interests between managers and shareholders because the managers 
will also have some degree of ownership in the company.  
 
According to Olivera et al. (2016), ownership concentration, which is defined as 
the percentage of shares owned by shareholders, is another mechanism in 
corporate governance. It is postulated that a high level of ownership 
concentration results in an effective monitoring power by investors over firm’s 
managerial decisions. Shareholders with large shareholding may use their voting 
power to initiate firm actions and decisions in a company such as the election of 
board members as well as the replacement of non-performing CEO or lackluster 
management. With this regard, the essential expectation is that substantial 
shareholding results in effective monitoring of the management by the 
shareholders, hence lowering the agency cost.  
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As described by Olivera et al. (2016), good corporate governance encompasses a 
set of relationships amongst the owners, board of directors, the management, 
auditors and other stakeholders. These relationships involve various rules and 
incentives; provide goals and objectives and also determine monitoring 
performance. Meanwhile, agency cost is a part of corporate governance which is 
a type internal company expense which comes from the actions of an agent 
(management) acting on behalf of a principal (owners or shareholders). Agency 
cost typically arises in the wake of core disruptions, dissatisfactions and 
inefficiencies such as conflict of interest between shareholders and management.  
 
Many studies have been conducted related to the relationship between corporate 
governance and corporation financial performance. Studies by Aggarwal (2013), 
Fauzi and Locke (2012) and Cheng Wu et al. (2010) found that corporate 
governance and firm performance is significantly positively related. Yegon et al. 
(2014), Hastori et al. (2015), Kuutol and Agyemang (2015), McKnight (2009), 
Sajid Gul et al. (2012), Tariq Aziz et al. (2015) and Garanina et al. (2016) 
focused on the association between corporate governance and agency cost and 
showed that corporate governance and agency cost are significantly negatively 
related, implying that higher director ownership reduces the level agency cost. 
 
There are several studies in the emerging countries which examined the 
relationship between agency cost and corporate performance. Among them are 
Alfadhl and Alabdullah (2013) and Jabbary et al. (2013) who studied multi 
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sector companies in Iraq and Iran, respectively, by using expense ratio and asset 
utilization as proxies of agency cost. The researchers found a significant negative 
relationship between agency cost and firm performance. Using a sample of listed 
firms in Nairobi Stock Exchange and asset utilization ratio to proxy agency cost, 
Salim (2014) found that there is a significant positive relationship between 
agency cost and profitability. Meanwhile in Indonesia, Enni Savitri (2018) 
utilized a sample of listed Indonesian manufacturing companies with family 
ownership (percentage % of share owned by family) where agency cost (expense 
ratio) is the independent variable and firm performance (ROA) is the dependent 
variable. It was found that family ownership and agency cost are significantly 
related with ROA. 
 
In Malaysia, Nur Syuhada (2014) used multi- sector companies to test the 
relationship between firm performance and agency cost. Studies focusing on 
manufacturing companies are quite lacking, hence, this study is conducted to fill 
the gap by examining the relationship between agency cost and financial 
performance of public-listed manufacturing firms in Malaysia. Manufacturing 
companies are selected due to the importance of this sector towards the economic 







1.2 Agency Cost and Firm’s Performance 
In large businesses, separation of ownership and management is inevitable. Most 
public listed companies have hundreds of shareholders and it makes it impossible 
for all shareholders to be involved in the management of the company. Hence, 
the separation of ownership and management allows shareholders to appoint the 
management to act on behalf them to manage the company. However, if 
managers’ objectives are different from shareholders’ objective, it will create 
agency problem. These problem come with associated cost normally referred to 
as agency cost. 
 
The agency theory offers two options to avoid agency problems. The first option 
is to develop a structure of governance where the contract based on agent’s 
behavior to generate agency costs aimed to monitor and assess the act of the 
agent (Madison 2014). Madison (2014) found that stewardship structures are 
advantageous for family-owned companies because they increase steward-like 
behavior of family employees. Notwithstanding, these structures are damaging 
because they increase the agent behavior of nonfamily employees. This shows 
that agency structures based on agent’s behavior are essential, but that 
stewardship structures can only be useful when a large number of family 
employees are employed.  The second option is to develop a governance 
structure that can facilitate supervision and appraisal of agent behavior, which 
typically comprises reporting procedure, inclusion of the main board of directors 




Agency cost of a firm can be indirectly gauged by several ratios. Among them 
are utilization ratio and expense ratio. Total assets turnover is a proxy for 
utilization ratio that measures agency cost of a company. This ratio is used to 
determine management efficiency in utilizing the assets of the company. 
According to Faisal (2005), higher the utilization ratio indicates that the assets 
are used more productively to create value to the shareholders. Meanwhile, 
another proxy for agency cost, the expense ratio, reflects discretionary 
management expenses using company resources. Faisal (2005) pointed out that 
higher management expenses result in higher agency cost. 
 
Higher agency cost indicates poor management of operational cost, which leads 
to low operating income and is possibly due to fraudulent management of the 
operating costs. It can increase the agency costs and adversely affects company’s 
profitability (Layyinaturrobaniyah & Fitriyana 2014). 
 
According to Kangarlouei et al. (2012), ROA and ROE are the most frequently 
used financial ratios to ascertain firm’s management overall effectiveness. ROA 
indicates how well a firm’s management is utilizing the assets to create income. 
Meanwhile, ROE is a profitability ratio that shows the amount of net income a 




Madaseh (2015) pointed out that, based on literature review, researchers and 
investors commonly used ROA and ROE to measure company performance. The 
study by Ang et al. (2000) explained that the commonly used financial measures 
of performance are ROA, gross profit, stock market return, total assets, revenue 
growth and earnings per share. According to Simerly and Mingfang (2000), 
measuring company performance has been major challenge for practitioners and 
scholars as well. 
 
1.3 Problem statement 
In general, agency problem occurs due to the conflicting objectives between 
managers and shareholders. This problem come with associated cost normally 
referred to as agency cost. This cost arises because shareholders are constantly 
trying to keep the managers focused on pursuing shareholders interest, with the 
hope that wealth will be increased accordingly. When a firm has debt, 
management is attracted to engage in selfish strategies, which results in costly 
agency cost on the firm, and lower the market value of the firm.  
 
According to Mojtahedzadeh (2010), agency costs represent a big portion of 
firm’s total costs and shareholders try to ensure the integrity of management 
activities and by increasing the percentage of management ownership so that 
agency costs will be reduced. Compared to publicly traded firms, 100 per cent 
managers-owned firms have almost zero agency cost. On the other hand, other 
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extreme are 0 per cent managers-owned. In between are companies where the 
managers own a certain percentage of the firm’s total equity.  
 
Separation of shareholders and management creates a conflict if managers act to 
their self-interest and this leads to the agency problem. According to Vilapour 
and Khoram (2010), when there is separation between ownership and 
management on a firm, there is the potential that managers make decisions that 
are aligned to their interests instead of the shareholders’. Almost every 
contractual relationship has agency problem where the agent promises to perform 
according to the terms stipulated by the principal. The main problem here is to 
ensure that the agent perform as promised.   
 
Agency problem does not only occur in the relationship between owners and 
managers. According to Armour et al. (2009), there are three generic agency 
problems that may occur in business organizations. Firstly, the agency problem 
that occurs due to the conflict between shareholders and managers. The problem 
occurs when the shareholders want to assure that the managers are in-line with 
the interest of the shareholders instead of carrying out their own personal 
interests. Secondly, the problem that occurs due to the conflict between majority 
shareholders and the minority shareholders. In this case, majority shareholders 
act as the agents while the minority shareholders act as the principals. Problem 
occurs when majority shareholders are pursuing their self-interests at the expense 
of the minority stockholders. Thirdly, the problem that occurs due to conflicts 
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between the management and other stakeholders such as the shareholders, 
employees, customers and creditors. In this case, the management as agent may 
not behave accordingly to other principals such as exploiting workers, 
expropriating creditors and misleading customers. 
 
In order to reduce agency cost, the law can play an important role. For example, 
disclosure requirement for agents can be enhances and also the principal can 
enable legal actions being taken towards dishonest or negligent agents (Armour 
et al., 2009). Furthermore, foreign investors, who are usually minority 
shareholders, are induced to drive investment of unrelated businesses in the 
group in order to reduce agency cost. In emerging countries, it is not unusual that 
many businesses have unrelated diversification due to political, cultural and 
economic condition. Usually, both principals and agents are interested to reduce 
agency cost in any business transaction. Therefore, an effective corporate 
governance structure has to be established to ensure that creditors and 
shareholders are effectively protected and also to ensure their investment return. 
In addition, it also enables to promote the condusive environment to the 
sustainable growth and efficiency of the corporate sector. 
 
Several studies done by previous researchers have examined the relationship 
between agency cost and other variables. For example, Atumwa (2013), 
determined whether there is a relationship between agency cost and leverage. 
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Meanwhile, Yegon et al. (2014), examined the relationship between agency cost 
and corporate governance.  
 
Alfadhl and Alabdullah (2013) and Jabbary et al. (2013) focused on the 
relationship between agency cost and firm performance in Iraq and Iran, 
respectively, and they used expense ratio and asset turnover ratio as proxies of 
agency cost. Salim Manal (2012) utilized asset utilization ratio as proxy of 
agency cost in examining the relationship between agency cost and firm 
performance. Meanwhile, Enni Savitri (2018) examined the relationship between 
agency cost and firm performance in Indonesia and used selling, general and 
administration ratio (SG&A) to measure agency cost. 
 
Many studies on corporate governance, specifically on the monitoring role of 
agency cost, have been conducted in different contexts, and agency cost has been 
proxied by efficiency (assets utilization, assets turnover), expense (SG&A), 
leverage, company’s growth and company’s size. In general, most of them are 
found to be significant in determining financial performance which is measured 








1.4 Research Questions 
Based on the problem statement discussed earlier, the research questions of the 
study are as follows. 
1. Is there any significant relationship between Return on Equity (ROE) and 
leverage for manufacturing companies in Malaysia? 
2. Is there any significant relationship between ROE and size for manufacturing 
companies in Malaysia? 
3. Is there any significant relationship between ROE and company’s growth for 
manufacturing companies in Malaysia? 
4. Is there any significant relationship between ROE and expenses for 
manufacturing companies in Malaysia? 
5. Is there any significant relationship between ROE and efficiency for 
manufacturing companies in Malaysia? 
 
1.5 Research Objectives  
Based on the research questions, the research objectives developed for this study 
are as follows. 
1. To examine the relationship between Return on Equity (ROE) and leverage for 
manufacturing companies in Malaysia. 
2. To investigate the relationship between ROE and size for manufacturing 
companies in Malaysia. 
3. To examine the relationship between ROE and company’s growth for 
manufacturing companies in Malaysia. 
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4. To investigate the relationship between ROE and expenses for manufacturing 
companies in Malaysia. 
5. To examine the relationship between ROE and efficiency for manufacturing 
companies in Malaysia. 
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
This study is important from the practical and theoretical point of view. 
Theoretical importance comes from demonstrating new findings on the 
relationship between agency cost, proxied by several variables, and firm 
performance.  
 
The findings are also expected to have practical contributions especially to 
shareholders, managers and policy makers specifically on formulating 
mechanisms to reduce agency cost and improve financial performance thus 
increasing the value of the company in Malaysia, particularly the public-listed 
manufacturing firms.  
 
Although many studies related to agency cost have been done in Malaysia, 
hardly any study examined the relationship between agency cost and corporate 
performance in the public-listed manufacturing companies. Manufacturing sector 
is chosen in this study due to the importance of the sector towards the growth of 




1.7 Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation contains five chapters and is organized as follows. Chapter one 
presents the introduction of the study, and chapter two discusses the underlying 
theories and also the relevant literature related to the problem statement of this 
study.  
 
Chapter three outlines the methodology, including the process of data collection, 
sampling procedure, measurement of variables and data analysis. Chapter four 
presents the findings and analysis on what have been discussed in chapter three. 
Finally, chapter five discusses the conclusion and implications of the study. 


















This chapter is to provides insights about agency cost and corporate 
performance. It discusses the basic concepts and definitions which include prior 
findings of the studies on agency costs and corporate performance as well as the 
various proxies of agency costs. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance 
Corporate governance is defined as a set of process, principles and systems that 
govern a company. It provides the guidelines of how a company can be 
controlled and guided to achieve   value-added objectives and goals that can 
benefit the shareholders, board of directors, management, employees, suppliers, 
customers, and also the community. Efficient allocation of resources will 
increase corporate performance or profitability. To ensure efficient allocation of 
resources, the management should be monitored effectively. There are many 
mechanisms in order to implement corporate governance in a company. One of 
the most common mechanisms of corporate governance is the presence of the 
boards of directors on behalf of shareholders to effectively monitor the 
management. Organized and strong board of directors is very important for 
creating effective oversight of the management. Meanwhile, the concentration of 
ownership is another mechanism in corporate governance, whereby a higher 
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level of ownership concentration can result in greater monitoring by the 
stockholders towards the managers.  
 
Of late, many researchers are interested to analyze the association between 
corporate governance and corporate performance, but the findings obtained from 
the studies have been mixed and rather inconclusive. For example, in Aggarwal 
(2013), corporate governance variables were regressed against the financial 
performance of Indian companies using a sample of 20 public-listed companies 
and found that they are positively related. This is similar to the study by Brown 
and Caylor (2004) which discovered that companies with better governance 
record higher profits, are more valuable and pay out higher dividends to their 
stockholders.  
 
Cheng Wu et al. (2010) found that firm performance has significant and negative 
relationship with corporate governance proxies. They also found that firm 
performance has positive relationship with board independence and insider 
ownership.   
 
In Ghana, Owusu and Weir (2016) found that Ghanaian corporate governance 
index (GCGI) and firm performance are significantly and positively related, 
implying that in general, most companies complied with the ‘2003 Ghanaian 
Corporate Governance Code’. In Malaysia, Ramachandra (2017) used 113 listed 
companies in Malaysia from 2008 to 2013 and used corporate governance index 
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of Malaysia (MCGI) as a proxy of corporate governance and found that it has 
positive relationship with firm performance  
 
In another angle, Vu and Nguyen (2017) used the dual role CEO, board size and 
board independence as proxies of corporate governance and included 137 public-
listed Singaporean companies from 2013 to 2016 to investigate the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance. The findings show 
that board size and firm performance are negatively related. However, the 
relationship between board independence and CEO duality with firm 
performance is not significant. 
 
Zaid Saidat et al. (2019) studied non-family-owned and family-owned companies 
to ascertain the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance of non-financial companies listed on Amman Security Exchange 
(ASE) from 2009 to 2015. They used size of board, CEO duality and number of 
independent directors to measure corporate governance and return on assets and 
Tobin’s Q as indicators of financial performance. The findings show that board 
size has negative relationship with the performance of family-owned companies 
but has no significant association with financial performance. There is a strong 
association between corporate performance and number of independent directors 
in family-owned firms. The findings also indicate that ownership concentration 
has a significant association with financial performance; while in family-owned 
firms, it has a negative and significant association with Tobin’s Q. 
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2.3 Agency Cost 
Agency cost is a part of corporate governance which is a type internal company 
expense which comes from the actions of an agent acting on behalf of a 
principal. Agency cost typically arises in the wake of core disruptions, 
dissatisfactions and inefficiencies such as conflict of interest between 
shareholders and management. 
 
The impact of agency cost on corporate governance has been of considerable 
interest to many academicians, practitioners and also businesses. Yegon et al. 
(2014) used several corporate governance proxies and regressed them against 
asset utilization, a proxy of agency cost. They sampled 9 service companies 
based on market capitalization from Nairobi Security Exchange (NSE) from 
2008 to 2012 and found that director and institutional ownership, as well as 
separation of CEO and chairman, are negatively related with agency cost. 
Meanwhile, board size and board independence are positively related with 
agency cost. 
 
Florackis (2008) used 897 firms of publicly traded UK firms as a sample for his 
study. He used asset turnover and expense ratio to measure agency cost in a 
regression against several corporate governance variables. The findings show 
that companies’ debt can act as a significant corporate governance mechanism. 
In addition, managerial ownership, managerial compensation and ownership 




With a sample of 54 public-listed companies in Indonesia, Hastori et al. (2015) 
investigated the influence of agency cost on agro-industrial firms. They used 
general and administration expenses to sales (SG&A) as a proxy of agency cost 
and ownership concentration, board of directors, board of commissioners, 
independent commissioners and audit committee as proxies of corporate 
governance. They found that agency costs are significantly related to dividend 
payout and leverage as well as several good governance mechanisms. Kuutol and 
Agyemang (2015) used board size, board independence and board gender 
diversity as proxies for corporate governance and asset turnover as a measure of 
agency cost to examine the influence of board characteristics on agency cost of 
public-listed firms in Ghana from 2005 to 2013. The study found that board size 
and board independence are significantly and negatively related to agency cost. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between board gender diversity and agency cost is 
positive. Furthermore, it was found that boards of the listed companies th 
dominated by male directors are more effective in lessening the agency cost. 
 
McKnight and Weir (2009) examined the effect of governance and ownership 
variables on agency cost. They used UK non-financial firms incorporated in 
FTSE 350 Share index Companies as their samples and used asset turnover and 
growth as proxies of agency cost, while board structures, nomination committee, 
board ownership and debt structure are used to measure corporate governance. 
They found that in general, the changes in the structure of the board have not 
19 
 
influenced the agency costs. As a result, they suggested several mechanisms that 
are in-line with firm value maximization. They also found that having a 
nomination committee in the board increases agency costs, indicating that there 
are costs related with certain governance mechanisms. Increasing board 
ownership and increasing debt also help to reduce agency costs.  
 
Sajid et al. (2012) studied a sample of 50 firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange 
(KSE) and used board size, CEO duality, independent directors, remuneration 
structure, director ownership and institutional ownership as proxies of corporate 
governance, while asset utilization ratio was used to measure agency cost. The 
findings showed that director and institutional ownership are negatively related 
with agency cost, but board size has a positive relationship with agency cost. In 
addition, board independence is positively related with asset utilization ratio, 
while the separation of the post of CEO and chairman and higher salary reduce 
the agency cost.  
 
In another study, Aziz et al. (2015) studied 100 public-listed firms in Pakistan for 
the period of 2007 to 2011. They used asset turnover (asset utilization) and 
general and administration expenses to sale (SG&A) ratio to measure agency 
cost, and regressed it with several corporate governance variables. The findings 
show that director and institutional ownership have negative relationship with 
agency cost, while the size of board of directors records positive association with 
agency cost. Board independence is positively related with asset utilization ratio, 
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and CEO and chairman separation and also remuneration are negatively 
associated with agency cost.  
 
Garanina et al. (2016) examined the relationship between corporate governance 
and agency cost in USA, Russia and Norway by using the data of 243 
companies, 196 Russian companies and 175 Norwegian companies. They found 
that board size has positive influence on agency costs. The percentage of female 
board members has a minimal positive effect in US companies, negatively 
related to agency costs in the Norwegian sample and is not significant in the 
Russian market. The authors also discovered that large Russian and US 
companies in the sample of the study have lower agency costs. 
 
Ochieng (2013) examined the influence of governance mechanism on firm 
agency cost by examining the impact of corporate governance in minimizing 
agency cost of 34 listed firms in Nigeria for the period of 2003 to 2013. The 
researcher used asset utilization ratio as a proxy of agency cost, and audit 
committee, nomination committee, CEO duality, non-executive board members, 
ownership by board and institutional ownership were used as proxies of 
corporate governance. The finding shows that t having audit committee and non-
executive board members reduces agency cost. However, the presence of 
nomination committee, CEO duality, institutional ownership and board 




2.4 Proxies of Agency Cost 
There are many proxies of agency cost that researchers used in their studies. The 
most used proxies of agency cost are assets utilization (efficiency) and expense. 
In this study, five proxies for agency cost are used, namely, leverage, firm size, 
company growth, efficiency and expense. The literature related to the proxies of 
agency cost selected is discussed in the following sections. 
 
2.4.1 Leverage and Agency Cost 
The agency theory stated that debt can reduce equity agency cost because debt 
reduces the free cash flow of a firm, limiting manager’s discretion to spend 
unnecessarily and thus is able to align the interests of managers and 
stockholders. The relationship between leverage and agency cost has been 
studied quite extensively in corporate finance research.  In Atumwa (2013),  the 
findings show that leverage is negatively related with agency cost based on the 
sample of60 listed companies in Nigeria from January 2008 to December 2011 
 
Li and Cui (2003) used 211 listed companies in China from 1999 to 2001. For 
agency cost, they used asset turnover ratio and for leverage, debt to asset ratio 
was used. The findings show debt decreases agency costs.  
 
Nazir et al. (2012) used a sample of 265 listed companies in Pakistan for the 
period of 2004 to 2009, and also found that leverage, proxied by total debt and 
short term debt ratios, has negative relationship with agency cost.  
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In another study, Zakaria et al. (2016utilized a sample of 53 listed Malaysian 
construction firms with total assets more than RM300 million for the period of 
2007 until 2012. They used asset turnover as a proxy for agency cost and debt 
ratio and debt to equity ratio to measure leverage. The results show that when the 
acquisition of company assets is financed by debt, the debt holders are more 
concerned with interest and principal payments. This limits the company from 
using funds to monitor agency problems. However, it is noted that an increase in 
the company cost to monitor agency problem positively affects the company’s 
debt relative to equity. The findings also revealed that when the company’s profit 
increase, the cost to monitor agency cost tends to increase.  
 
Zheng (2013) included 775 firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets 
for the period of 2010 to 2012 in the sample of his study and found that debt is 
negatively related with agency costs. The other variables are not significantly 
related with each other.  
 
2.4.2 Leverage and corporate performance 
The research on optimal capital structure is still unfolding as many related 
studies are being conducted by researchers (Gill et al., 2011). In the static trade-
off theory of capital structure, profitable companies are expected to have a higher 
leverage ratio. In a study done by Akeem et al. (2014) on Nigerian 
manufacturing firms from 2003 to 2012, it was found that capital structure has a 
negative relationship with firm performance and the researchers proposed that 
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companies should utilize equity more compared to debt because debt can 
increase firm’s value through the tax savings or tax deductibility component.  
 
Abeywardhana (2015) looked at n SME companies in the UK for the period of 
1998 to 2008 to investigate the association between leverage and profitability. 
The findings reveal that there is a significant negative relationship between 
capital structure and profitability. Long-term debt to total assets ratio has 
negative association with profitability and this shows that SMEs do not like to 
use more equity for fear of losing control of the company.  
 
In another study, Habib et al. (2016) used panel data of listed firms in Pakistan 
for the period of 2003 to 2012. ROA was used to measure performance, whereas 
short term debt to asset, long term debt to asset, and total debt to asset are used 
as measures for leverage. The findings show that short term debt, long term debt 
and total debt are negatively related with ROA. However, in another study, Idode 
et al. (2014) found that debt is positively related with profitability among listed 
Nigerian firms from 2008 to 2012.  
 
In Javed et al. (2015), the sample consists of 154 Pakistani firms from 2006 to 
2011 and the researchers found that debt relationship with profitability.. 
Meanwhile, Muscettola (2016) used a sample of 7,370 Italian SMEs for the 
period from 2006 to 2010 and the findings show that profitability is negatively 
influenced by debt.  In another study, based on a sample of 50 Nigerian listed 
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companies for the period of 1990 to 2004, Salawu (2009) found that profitability 
has positive relationship with short-term debt and negative association with long-
term debt. 
 
Hence, this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H1a: Corporate performance is positively related with leverage  
 
2.4.3 Firm’s Size and corporate performance 
The relationship between firm’s size and profitability has been examined quite 
thoroughly in finance. For example, Niresh and Velnampy (2014) utilized a 
sample of 15 manufacturing companies listed in Colombo Stock Exchange 
(CSE) for a period of 2008 to 2012 to examine the relationship between firm size 
and profitability, where ROA and net profit were used for profitability and total 
asset and total sales were used for size. The results show that as f firm size and 
profitability are not significantly related.  
 
Pervan and Visic (2012) used a sample of 2,050 Croatian manufacturing firms 
from 2002 to 2010 to investigate the relationship between company size and firm 
performance. The findings show that size has a weak positive relationship with 
profitability, whereby larger companies have the ability to charge higher prices 
on their products or services and therefore record higher income. An explanation 
of this weak relationship can be attributed to the separation of ownership and 
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management in corporations that transfer manager’s priority from profit 
maximization to managerial utility maximization. 
Abbasi and Malik (2015) found that firm size has moderating effect on the 
association between firm growth and firm performance. Meanwhile, in Ghana, 
Abiodun (2013) found that firm size is positively related with profitability, which 
is measured by ROA. In another study, Inyiama and Victoria (2014) investigated 
the impact of firm size on financial performance of Nigeria brewery companies 
from 2003 to 2013. Earnings per share were used to measure performance and 
total asset was used to measure firm size. Similarly, the results show that firm 
size has positive effect on firm performance.  
 
In another study, Mule et al. (2015) selected 53 companies listed on Nairobi 
Securities Exchange (NSE) from 2010 to 2014 and found that firm size is 
significantly and positively related with ROE. The findings also show that 
ownership concentration is positively associated with profitability. In addition, 
Vinasithamby (2015) also found that company size is positively related to 
profitability, as measured by ROA.  
 
Ramasamy et al. (2005) selected 30 plantation companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia for the period of 2000 to 2003 and the regression results show that firm 
size is negatively related with profitability. This implies that bigger companies 
are more complex and thus difficult to manage, resulting in inefficiencies and 





Hence, the following hypothesis is developed: 
Ha2: Corporate performance is positively related with firm size  
 
2.4.4 Company growth and corporate performance 
High growth company requires more monitoring because the managers are more 
prone to take higher because large amount of assets is easier to obtain and this 
resulting in higher agency cost. Results obtained by previous researchers 
pertaining to the relationship between company growth and corporate 
performance have been mixed. For example, Moeinfar and Mousavi (2011) used 
a sample of 162 companies in Tehran for the period of 2006 to 2009 and found 
that growth rate and ROA are significantly and positively related. 
 
In another study, Ting et al. (2014) studied 240 Malaysian listed companies from 
2001 to 2010 by using sales growth, total assets growth, fixed assets growth and 
employment growth as proxies of organizational growth while ROA and ROE 
were used as proxies of profitability. The results indicated that firm’s growth is 
positively associated with profitability. Yoo and Kim (2015) used sales growth, 
total assets growth and employment growth as proxies of firm growth. They 
studied 264 small and medium size construction firms for the period 2000 to 
2014 in Korea and also found that growth is positively related with profitability. 
Similarly, the study by Tingler (2015) where 50 Western European and Northern 
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America chemical companies for the period from 2003 to 2012 were chosen as 
the sample show that firm growth is positively related with performance. This is 
also supported by S. Coban (2014) who used a sample of 137 listed 
manufacturing companies in Turkey for the period 1997 to 2012 and firm growth 
is measured  by sales growth. The findings show similar result whereby there 
firm growth is positively related with profitability.  
 
Meanwhile, a study by Loi and Khan (2012) used 13,552 Belgian companies for 
the period of 2001 to 2006 in the sample and showed that profitability is not 
significantly influenced by company growth. Fitzsimmons (2005) who used sales 
growth and employment growth as proxies of firm growth discovered that the 
volatility of growth rate is consistently high and its relationship with profitability 
is not straightforward.  
 
Hence, this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
Ha3: Corporate performance is positively related with company growth  
 
2.4.5 Expense and corporate performance 
Expense ratio formula is operating expense divided by annual sales. Based on 
Ang et al. (2000), expense this ratio can be regarded to directly measure agency 
cost since it effectively measures how well the management is managing the 
operating costs. Boldeanu and Pugna (2014) used a sample of 23 pharmaceutical 
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firms from 2010 to 2013 to study the relationship between ROE and expenses 
and found that they are negatively related.  
 
Johnson (2016) chose a sample of 38,737 companies for the period of 1990 to 
2011 and discovered that change in expenses (SG&A) provides information 
change in profitability, implying that expenses and firm performance are 
negatively related. Furthermore, the study by Okwo (2012) also shows that 
expense ratio is significantly and negatively related with profitability. 
 
Similar findings were also found in Tronconi et al. (2011) who chose a sample of 
828 European firms from 2000 to 2006, whereby expense ratio is negatively 
related with ROA. In addition, Wang and Lu (2014) examined 1355 companies 
in Taiwan over the period of 2001 to 2012 and found that organizational capital 
which proxied by SG&A, has a negative effect on profitability. 
 
Hence, this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
Ha4: Corporate performance is negatively related with expenses  
 
2.4.6 Efficiency and corporate performance 
In Ang et al. (2000), agency cost was measured by asset utilization ratio 
(efficiency), which is calculated as annual sales divided by total assets and it 




Jabbary et al. (2013) studied the impact of efficiency (asset turnover) on 
performance and chose a sample of 73 Iranian listed firms from 2006 to 2010. 
The results show that ROA and efficiency is positively related. Furthermore, 
Santosuosso (2014) studied 215 Italian listed companies for the period of 2004 to 
2013 and found significant positive association between efficiency (proxied by 
asset turnover, inventory turnover and account receivable turnover) and firm 
performance (ROA). 
 
Sari et al. (2014) used asset turnover to measure efficiency and studied 9 
Indonesian pharmaceutical firms for the period of 2006 to 2010 and found that 
efficiency (asset turnover) significantly influences return on asset (ROA). Sarwat 
et al. (2017) also found that assets turnover ratio (efficiency) is significantly and 
positively related with ROA.  
 
Hence, this study proposes the following hypothesis: 

















This chapter discusses the conceptual framework, hypotheses of the study and 
the research design of the study.  
 
3.2 Conceptual Framework  
Independent Variables Dependent Variables
AGENCY
COST











3.3 Hypotheses of Study 
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Based on literature review regarding the relationship between agency cost and 
corporate performance, these are the hypotheses for this study. 
 
 
H1a: Corporate performance is positively related with leverage  
 
H2a: Corporate performance is positively related with firm size  
 
H3a: Corporate performance is positively related with company growth  
 
H4a: Corporate performance is negatively related with expenses  
 
H5a: Corporate performance is positively related with efficiency  
 
As there is no direct measurement for agency costs, this study uses proxies based 
on earlier studies. For corporate performance or profitability, Return on Equity 
(ROE) is employed. 
 
3.4 Research Design 
According to Dooley (2007), a research design is an outline that is used to give 
answer to research problem. The data in this study was collected from Bursa 
Malaysia, covering the period of 2012 to 2016. Regression analysis is considered 
appropriate in this study to examine the relationship between the dependent 
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variable (ROE) and the independent variables (leverage, firm’s growth, firm’s 
size, efficiency and expense).  
 
 
3.5 Data Collection 
This study utilized secondary data from companies listed in Bursa Malaysia. 
Secondary data ensure precision and accuracy of data other than via 
questionnaires and interviews (Sekaran 1992 and Yaacob 2011). 
 
The secondary data collected were revenue, expenses, assets, liabilities and 
equity. They are credible and reliable because they were audited by professional 
external auditors.  
 
The population of this study covers manufacturing companies listed in Bursa 
Malaysia from 2011 to 2016. Based on Choong (2016), there are 11 sectors 
classified in the manufacturing industry, according to the Malaysian Investment 














Classifications of manufacturing sectors according to MIDA 
No Manufacturing sector No of firm
1 Non-metalic mineral industry 55
2 Aerospace 1
3 Textiles and textile product 36
4 Basic metal products 33
5 Electrical and electronic 46
6 Engineering support 9
7 Food & sustainable resources 105
8 Machinery and equipment 103




Source: Adopted from Malaysian Investment Development Authority (MIDA)
   
 In 2016, the total listed firms in Bursa Malaysia are 904. After excluding the 
financial sectors, there are 813 listed companies in Bursa Malaysia. Financial 
sector companies are excluded from the sample because they have different 
regulatory framework and annual report presentation compared to other 
companies (Yaacob, 2011). Out of the 813 listed companies, 457 companies are 
identified based on MIDA classification as shown in table 3.4 above. From the 
457 manufacturing companies, 130 (28%) companies are selected to be in the 
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sample. Furthermore, companies with incomplete data from 2012 to 2016 were 
also taken out  
 
Finally, 130 firms were selected to be included in the sample.  
 
 
3.6 Analysis of Data 
This study used descriptive analysis, correlation analysis, diagnostic test and 
multiple linear regression analysis to analyzing the data and to determine 
relationship between agency cost and corporate performance.  
 
3.6.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive analysis is analysis that help us to simplify the large number of data. 
Descriptive analysis is very important because the data can be present in 
meaningful way to allow simpler interpretation which we can get information 
about distribution or spread of the data. 
 
3.6.2 Correlation analysis 
Correlation analysis is analysis to examine whether multicollinearity exist among 
variables or not. Multicollinearity exist if the correlation value between variable 
exceed 0.8. According to Hair et al. (2010), multicollinearity is a type of 
disturbance in the data, which may distort the result of regression. And if 
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multicollinearity present in the data, the conclusion made about the data may not 
be reliable. 
 
3.6.3 Diagnostic Test 
In this study, four type of diagnostic test have been used which is normality test, 
heteroscedasticity test, multicollinearity test and stationery test. Normality test is 
conducted to determine whether or not the data are normally distributed. 
Heteroscedasticity test is test to see whether size of error term differs across 
values independent variables. Multicollinearity test is test to see whether 
multicollinearity test exist among variables by find the “Variance Inflation 
Factor” (VIF) by using eviews system. And Stationery test is test to see whether 
the variables is stationery of not. Stationery series is a flat series without trend 
whereby the mean and variance are constant over time with no periodic 
fluctuation.   
 
3.6.4 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
Multiple linear regression analysis is a type of analysis that analyzing 
relationship among multiple variables. This type of analysis is to see the 
relationship between a dependent variable and more dependent variables whether 
the relationship is significant or not and positive or negative relationship. In this 
study dependent variable is corporate performance (ROE) and independent 













3.7 Operational Definitions 
3.7.1 Leverage 
Leverage refers the level of borrowings or debt a company has in financing its 
assets. By definition, it is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Accordingly, the 
higher leverage of a company, the greater is its financial risk. 
 
3.7.2 Firm Growth 
 A growth firm is a company that is growing relatively faster than its peers or the 
general economy. There are many ways to determine firm’s growth, but 
generally a growth firm records an increase in annual revenue more than the 
industry average over a sustained period. Growth firms typically have innovative 
products or services that draw in more consumers. In this study, growth rate is 
calculated as the total assets for current year minus the total assets in the 




3.7.3 Firm’s size 
In any industry, firms have different sizes, depending on their total sales and 
total assets, which influence the sizes of operating costs. Measures of firm size in 
previoius empirical studies include total assets, number of employees, total sales 
and market capitalization.  Based on the argument made by Trigueiros (1995) 




Efficiency ratio evaluates the ability of a firm to manage its assets and liabilities 
efficiently. The ratio includes inventory turnover ratio, receivable turnover ratio, 
accounts payable to sales ratio and few other working capital ratios. Usually, the 
ratio is used in comparing with the other companies in same industry in order to 
identify companies that have better management team compared to the others. In 
this study, asset turnover ratio is used to determine efficiency of a firm. 
 
3.7.5 Expense Ratio 
Expense ratio evaluates the level or proportion of assets used for administrative 
and other operating expenses. This ratio is calculated by dividing administration 
and other operating expenses by average dollar value of a company’s assets. 
Operating expenses lower the assets and the return to a fund’s investor. In this 
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study, administrative and other operating expenses divided by sales ratio is used 
to measure expense ratio. 
 
3.7.6 Corporate Performance 
Corporate performance is a measure to assess of how good a company performs 
its objectives as stipulated by the shareholders. In this study corporate 
performance is measure by Return on Euity (ROE). It is calculated as net income 
or net loss divided by total equity of the company. 
 
 
3.8 Data Analysis 
Multiple linear regression analysis, correlation analysis and descriptive analysis 
are used to determine the relationship between proxies of agency costs, namely, 
leverage, firm’s growth, firm’s size, efficiency and expense ratio, and corporate 
performance. Eviews statistical package is used to analyze the data. 
 
3.8.1 Analytical Model 
The statistical analysis is to examine if there is a significant relationship between 
proxies of agency cost (leverage, growth, firm’s size, efficiency and expense) 
and corporate performance. Hence, a multiple regression model or equation is 
developed to analyze the relationship between agency cost and corporate 




ROE = α + β1 LEVERAGE + β2 GROWTH + β3 SIZE + β4 EFFICIENCY -
β5 EXPENSE + e (error term) 
 
Where, 
ROE: Return on Equity (ROE) measures the profitability of a company relative 
to its equity, and it is an indicator of how effective the management uses the 
equity to create wealth for the shareholders. The ROE in this study is measured 
by net income divided by the total equity of the company. 
 
 
ROE = Net Income 
 ---------------- x 100 
  Total equity 
 
LEVERAGE: A leverage ratio measures the level of debt in a company. It is 
calculated as non-current liabilities plus current liabilities divided by total assets 
of the company. 
   
Leverage = Non-current liabilities + Current liabilities 
                   --------------------------------------------------    x 100 
                   Total assets 
 
GROWTH: In this study firm’s growth is calculated as total assets in current 
year minus total assets in previous year divided by total assets in previous year. 
 
Growth = (Total assets current year – Total assets previous year) 
                 -----------------------------------------------------------------   x 100 
40 
 
                    Total assets previous year 
 
FIRM SIZE: Firm size can be measured with various indicators such as total 
assets, sales and market capitalization. In this research, firm size is calculated as 
the book value of total assets and the formula is: 
 
Firm size = Log (ln) Total assets 
 
EFFICIENCY: Efficiency ratio is a simple and direct measure of a firm’s ability 
to convert its resources into sales or revenue. A decline in the efficiency ratio 
shows either increasing costs or decreasing revenues. The formula of efficiency 
in this study is: 
 
Efficiency =   Revenue 
            --------------- 
                       Total assets 
  
EXPENSE RATIO: Expense ratio evaluates the level of administrative and 
other operating expenses with respect to the revenue of a company. The formula 
of expense ratio used in this study as follow: 
 
Expense ratio = Administrative expenses + Other operating expenses 
                           --------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Revenue 
 
 
3.9 Techniques of Data Analysis 
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In this study, descriptive analysis, correlation analysis and multiple regression 
analysis are used to explain the relationship between agency costs and corporate 
performance of the companies. 
 
3.10 Summary 
This chapter outlines the methodology used for this research and has discussed 
the research framework, hypotheses of the study and also the research design. 
The sampling procedure is explained and the variables in the regression model 
are elaborated.  
CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the results of the regression conducted in the study 
between ROE and agency costs variables.   
 
4.2 Descriptive Analysis 
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LEVERAGE SIZE GROWTH EXPENSE EFFICIENCY ROE
 Mean 0.317872 19.36783 0.119529 0.220807 0.970269 0.057497
 Median 0.291938 19.29813 0.043889 0.160499 0.918093 0.069546
 Maximum 2.312677 23.84575 36.54977 6.342474 3.206369 5.900444
 Minimum 0.01546 15.92366 -0.748525 0.01203 0.0338 -13.1028
 Std. Dev. 0.191629 1.125312 1.442025 0.308482 0.46963 0.58754
 Skewness 2.080316 0.593518 24.86723 12.94187 1.432771 -15.8007
 Kurtosis 19.93479 3.763296 628.6146 243.9881 6.793848 403.6444
 Jarque-Bera 8235.99 53.94114 10667237 1591017 612.2084 4374354
 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0
   
Table 4.1 – Descriptive analysis among variable. 
 
From the table 4.1, a total 650 data from each variable were studied for 5-year 
period from 2012 to 2016. The table shows that from total observation of 650 of 
variable leverage, the mean is 0.317872 with standard deviation 0.191629. The 
skewness is a measure the symmetry of the data whether the data fit into normal 
bell-curve. Skewness with near to 0 is more symmetry and from the table shows 
that skewness of leverage stands at 2.080316 which is not symmetrically bell-
shaped.  
 
In other hand kurtosis is a measure of whether the data are heavy-tailed or light-
tailed or a measure of the peakness or flattness of a curve. The distribution is 
called normal if kurtosis stand at 3. From the table shows that kurtosis for 
leverage stand at 19.93479. This shows that leverage have peak distribution 




Meanwhile for variable size which was proxied by natural log (ln) of total asset 
from the table shows that the value for mean is 19.36783 with standard deviation 
1.125312. The value of skewness for variable size stand at 0.593518 shows that 
the data nearly symmetry due to the skewness value near to 0 and for kurtosis the 
value is 3.763296 show that the data have normal tail due to the kurtosis value 
near to 3.  
 
For variable growth in the table show that mean value stands at 0.119529 with 
standard deviation 1.442025. The value of skewness is 24.86723 which is not 
symmetry due to not near to 0 and the value of kurtosis stand at 628.6146 show 
that the distribution data for growth have peak distribution due to 628.6146 > 3. 
This is because as per table show that the minimum value is -0.748525 and 
maximum value is 36.54977 which the gap is very high. 
 
While for expense from the table show that the average value is 0.220807 with 
standard deviation 0.308482. The value of skewness stands at 12.94187 show 
that the data distribution not symmetry into normal bell-curve and the value of 
kurtosis is 243.9881 shows that the data have peak-tail due to more than 3. The 
value of kurtosis is high because of the gap between data is high which is as per 
table the value of minimum is 0.01203 and the value of maximum is 6.342474. 
 
Finally, the mean efficiency which is proxied by sale divide by total assets is 
0.970629 with standard deviation 0.46963. The value of skewness is 1.4332771 
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which is near to 0 describe that the distribution of the data near symmetry and 
the value of kurtosis is 6.793848 show the data have peak-tail due to more than 
3. The value of kurtosis is high due to gap between minimum value and 

























GROWTH 0.065004 0.072451 1.000000
0.0978 0.0649 -----
EXPENSE 0.006394 -0.152033* -0.022564 1.000000
0.8707 0.0001 0.5658 -----
EFFICIENCY 0.285375* 0.039754 -0.047540 -0.197966* 1.000000
0.0000 0.3115 0.2261 0.0000 -----
ROE -0.113339* 0.134777* 0.010873 -0.007738 0.049030 1.000000
0.0038 0.0006 0.7820 0.8439 0.2119 -----
    
Table 4.2 – Pearson Correlation Matrix among variables 
 
Pearson Correlation analysis is used to examine whether multicollinearity exists 
among regressor or not. Correlation matrix is a method to detecting 
multicollenearity. Table 4.2 shows that there is no correlation exceeds 0.8 
showing that multicollinearity does not exist among the independent variables in 
this study (Kennedy, 1998; Anderson et al., 1999; Brayman and Cramer, 2001).  
 
Based on table 4. 2, ROE has positive correlation with firm’s size, company 
growth and efficiency. Positive correlated means that every unit increase of 
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independent variables which is firm’s size, company growth and efficiency is 
predicted to be accompanied by increase in ROE by 0.13477, 0.010873 and 
0.049030 respectively. For variables company growth and efficiency, the 
relationship with ROE is weak or not significant due to correlation value is 
0.010873 or 1.08% and 0.049030 or 4.90% respectively. 
 
Meanwhile, ROE has negative relationship with leverage and expense. This 
means that every unit increase in independent variables which is leverage and 
expense is predicted to be accompanied by decrease in ROE by 0.113339 and 
0.007738. For expense, the relationship with ROE is not significant due to 
correlation value is 0.007738 or 0.77%. 
 
This result is in line to the study with Niresh and Velnampy (2014) which found 
a weak positive relationship between firm’s size and ROA but not in-line with 
Muscettola (2016) which concluded that debt is negatively related with ROA. 
 
Leverage and efficiency recorded the highest correlation of 0.2853, showing that 
when leverage moves or changes by 1 unit, efficiency will change by 0.285375 
or 28.54%. This result in line to the study by Atumwa (2013) which found that 
significant relationship between leverage and asset utilization (efficiency). 
 
The correlation between expense and efficiency is -0.197966, implying that for 
every unit increase in expense, there is a decrease in efficiency by 0.197966 or 
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19.80% and vice versa. This result is same result found by Aziz (2015) who 
found that expense ratio is negative and significant relationship with asset 
turnover (efficiency).  
 
The correlation between size and expense is -0.152033, showing that when size 
changes by 1%, expense will change by 0.15%. The same result found by Aziz 
(2015) where size have negative and significant relationship with expense ratio. 
 
Other correlation among independent variables was not significant which are 
correlation between leverage and size, leverage and company growth, leverage 
and expense, size and company growth and size and efficiency which have 
positive and not significant and the correlation value are 0.075573, 0.065004, 
0.006394, 0.072451 and 0.039754 respectively. Meanwhile correlation between 
company growth and expense and company growth and efficiency is negative 
and not significant and the correlation value are -0.022564 and -0.047540. 
However, there are no correlation value exceeds 0.8 means that multicollinearity 









4.4 Diagnostic Tests 
This section discusses diagnostic test which are normality test, heteroscedasticity 
test and multicollinearity test. 
 
4.4.1 Normality Test 
   
Table 4.3 – Normality Test 
Normality tests are conducted to determine whether or not the data are normally 
distributed. From the results in table 4.3 in this study show that P value is 0.0000 
which is less than 5% means that the variables does not follow normal 
distribution. However, we still can use the data since it not big issue and does not 

















Mean       1.77e-16
Median   0.005299
Maximum  5.821534
Minimum -12.70515
Std. Dev.   0.575194
Skewness  -14.92957
Kurtosis   383.9183
Jarque-Bera  3953905.
Probability   0.000000
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4.4.2 Heteroscedasticity Test 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     F-statistic 3.891994    Prob. F(5,644) 0.0018 
Obs*R-squared 19.06518    Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.0019 
Scaled explained SS 3583.126    Prob. Chi-Square(5) 0.0000 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 06/30/19   Time: 23:54   
Sample: 1 650    
Included observations: 650   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 9.518726 4.450446 2.138825 0.0328 
COMPANY_GROWTH -0.083568 0.175447 -0.476314 0.6340 
EFFICIENCY -0.506096 0.572186 -0.884496 0.3768 
EXPENSE 0.617181 0.842635 0.732441 0.4642 
LEVERAGE 4.980041 1.379108 3.611060 0.0003 
SIZE -0.537316 0.226981 -2.367227 0.0182 
     
     R-squared 0.029331    Mean dependent var 0.330339 
Adjusted R-squared 0.021795    S.D. dependent var 6.469144 
S.E. of regression 6.398259    Akaike info criterion 6.559117 
Sum squared resid 26363.89    Schwarz criterion 6.600443 
Log likelihood -2125.713    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.575146 
F-statistic 3.891994    Durbin-Watson stat 2.094246 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001752    
     
     
 
Table 4.4- Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
Homoscedasticity describes a situation in which the error term (that is the 
random disturbance in the relationship between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable) is the same across all value of the independent variable. 
Meanwhile, heteroscedasticity which is the violation of homoscedasticity is 
present when size of the error term differs across values of independent 
variables. Variables are not heteroscedasticity or meaning the variables are 
homoscedasticity if P value is more than 5%. From the table, Obs*R-squared 
value is 19.06518 and P value at 0.0019 or 0.19% which is less than 5% means 
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that the data are heteroscedasticity and we cannot accept the model. However, 
we still can use the data since it not big issue and does not pose a serious 
problem in panel regression. 
 
4.4.3 Multicollinearity Test 
Variance Inflation Factors




Variable Variance VIF VIF
COMPANY_GROWTH  0.000251  1.021731  1.014748
EFFICIENCY  0.002666  6.038560  1.144739
EXPENSE  0.005783  1.620833  1.071173
LEVERAGE  0.015490  4.158577  1.107231
SIZE  0.000420  307.8879  1.034299
C  0.161313  314.4827 NA
   
Table 4.5 – Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity is a state of very high intercorrelations or inter-association 
among the independent variables. It is therefore a type of disturbance in the data, 
which may distort the result of regression according to Hair et al. (2010) and if 
present in the data the statistical inferences made about the data may not be 
reliable. In other word, high correlation between independent variables could 
bring about unreliable findings. There are two methods to test whether the data 
have multicolllinearity or not. First method is to do correlation analysis among 
the independent variables. If there is significant correlation which is correlation 
exceeds 0.8 between independent variables means the data have 
multicollinearity. As discuss in chapter 4.2 correlation analysis, there are no 
correlation exceeds 0.8 means that there is no multicollinearity among the 
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variables. Second method is to find the “Variance Inflation Factor” (VIF) value. 
If VIF value less than 3, there is no multicollinearity exists among the variables. 
In this study, Eviews system have been used to generate VIF value. From the 
table 4.4.3 above stated that all centered VIF value less 3. It means that there 
multicollinearity does not exist among the variables. 
 
4.4.4 Stationary Test 
A stationary series is said to be a flat series without trend whereby the mean and 
variance are constant over time and have no periodic fluctuations. Stationary of 
the series also means that the distribution of the series does not change much. It 
provides framework in which averaging make sense. In this study, Eviews 
software is used to do stationary test. The table of result from stationery test can 
be seen at appendix I to appendix V. 
 
The result from the stationery test show that all variables which is leverage, 
growth, size, expense and efficiency are stationery. Result from the test show 
that t-statistic value is more than critical value and P value is less than 5% for all 
variables. This mean that all variables are stationery and the series are constant 













Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1.406983 0.401638 -3.503109 0.0005
COMPANY_GROWTH 0.006285 0.015834 0.396932 0.6915
EFFICIENCY 0.117989 0.051638 2.284939 0.0226
EXPENSE 0.065821 0.076045 0.865546 0.3871
LEVERAGE -0.467764 0.124460 -3.758348 0.0002
SIZE 0.076591 0.020484 3.739010 0.0002
R-squared 0.041587 Mean dependent var 0.057497
Adjusted R-squared 0.034146 S.D. dependent var 0.587540
S.E. of regression 0.577422 Akaike info criterion 1.748702
Sum squared resid 214.7201 Schwarz criterion 1.790028
Log likelihood -562.3280 Hannan-Quinn criter 1.764731
F-statistic 5.588809 Durbin-Watson stat 2.184336
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000047
    
Table 4.6: Regressions between ROE and Independent Variables (Company 
Growth, Efficiency, Expense, Leverage and Size)  
 
Table 4.6 above shows the regression results of ROE against the independent 
variables which are company growth, efficiency, expense leverage and size for 





The results show that the R
2
 is 4.16 %, which is quite low, but does not pose a 
serious problem in panel regression since the R square value does not have a 
critical value that allows a formation of conclusion. (Keller and Warrack, 2003). 
 
Three out of the five independent variables are found to be significantly related 
with ROE, namely, efficiency, leverage and size. The result in table 4.5 shows 
that efficiency is positively and significantly related with ROE (Coefficient = 
0.1179, p = 0.0226) and this is similar with the findings by Santosuosso (2014), 
Sari et al. (2011), Sarwat (2017) and Jabbari et al. (2013). The positive 
relationship shows that more efficient a company used their assets, more 
profitable the company or increase the corporate performance. Santosuosso 
(2014) found that positive and significant association between efficiency where 
proxies by asset turnover, inventory turnover and account receivables turnover 
and firm performance (ROE). While Sari et al. found that variable efficiency 
measured by asset turnover influence positive and significantly to variable return 
on assets (ROA). Sarwat (2017) and Jabbari et al. (2013) in their studies found 
that asset turnover (efficiency) have positive and significant relationship with 
firm performance (ROA). Inconsistent with the findings by Warrad and Omari 
(2015) where the studied show that there is no significant impact of turnover 
ratio (efficiency) on Jordanian service sectors’ profitability (ROE).  
 
Meanwhile for leverage, the result in this study shows that leverage is negatively 
and significantly related with ROE (Coefficient = -0.467764, p = 0.0002). The 
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negative relationship shows that more less used debt in financing the business 
will increase corporate performance. This result in-line and consistent with the 
findings by Akeem et al. (2014), Abeywardhana (2015), Habib et al. (2016), 
Javed et al. (2015) and Muscettola (2016). Akeem et al. (2014) found that debt to 
equity ratio has negative association with firm performance. Abeywardhana 
(2015) in his studied also show that a significant relationship between capital 
structure and profitability and the relationship is negatively related. The study 
conducted by Habib et al. (2016) shows that debt and ROA are negatively 
related. Similar findings are shown in by Javed et al. (2015) and Muscettola 
(2016) who found that leverage is negatively related to both ROAand ROE. 
Meanwhile, the result is inconsistent with the studied by Idode et al. (2014) 
whereby debt is positively related with ROA.  
 
Table 4.6 shows that size is positive and significant related with ROE 
(Coefficient = 0.076591, p = 0.0002) and this finding in-line and consistent with 
studied by Niresh and Velnampy (2014), Pervan and Visic (2012), Abbasi and 
Malik (2015), Abiodun (2013), Inyiama and Victoria (2014), Mule et al. (2015) 
and Vinasithamby (2015). In Niresh and Velnampy (2014), it was found that size 
and profitability are positively related among manufacturing firms in Sri Lanka. 
Pervan and Visic (2012) found that size have weak positive impact on 
profitability and Abbasi and Malik (2015) also found that firm size has 
moderating effect on firm performance. Abiodun (2013) and Inyiama and 
Victoria (2014) found that firm size has a positive influence on profitability. The 
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study by Mule et al. (2015) also found positive relationship between size and 
ROE, and so did Vinasithamby (2015). 
 
Meanwhile two out five independent variables are found to be not significant 
related with ROE, namely company growth and expense. The result table 4.5 
shows that company growth is not significant related with ROE (Coefficient = 
0.006285, p = 0.6915) and similar with variable expense which is not significant 
related with ROE (Coefficient = 0.065821, p = 0.3871) 
 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents the findings of this study in the form of descriptive 
statistics, correlation analysis, and regression analysis.  Normality test and 
stationary test were conducted. In the regression result, three independent 
variables, namely, efficiency, leverage and size are found to be significantly 
















CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter consists of summary findings, conclusion of the study, limitation, 
recommendation and suggestion for further studies. This study is intended to 
determine the relationship between the five independent variables namely 
leverage, size, growth, expense and efficiency and a dependent variable 
corporate performance.  
 
5.2 Summary of Findings  
The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between agency cost 
and corporate performance of manufacturing companies listed in Bursa Malaysia 
for the period from 2011 to 2016. To achieve this o, a regression analysis was 
conducted whereby corporate performance was regressed against the 
independent variables namely, leverage, size, growth, expense and efficiency. 




The study found that in the model, three out of five proxy of agency cost are 
significantly related to corporate performance which measured by ROE. The 
three variables which significantly related with corporate performance (ROE) are 
efficiency, leverage and size with p-value of 0.0226, 0.0002 and 0.0002 
respectively as per table 4.6. Other two variables found that not significant 
related with corporate performance (ROE) which are company growth and 
expense with p-value 0.6915 and 0.3871 respectively. Hence the study found that 
agency cost to be significantly related with corporate performance. 
 
The study also found that there was no multiconllinearity and autocorrelation 
among all the variables tested. Finally, the result in this study found that the data 
in this study are stationery mean that the distribution of the data constant over 
time, no periodic fluctuation and the data does not change much.  
 
5.3 Limitation 
One of the limitations is the scope of this study in which the sample size focuses 
only on the manufacturing sector which exclude the involvement the other 
sectors such as transportation, service, communication and many others. In this 
research, researchers could learn how the independent variables can affect the 
corporate performance in manufacturing sector in Malaysia from year 2011 to 




Secondly, this study is based on the time period from 2011 to 2016. If different 
time was chosen, different results would have been reported. Besides, there are 
some companies in manufacturing sector having different closing accounting 
period for their company annual reports. Therefore, the accuracy of the data 
could still be improved if all companies have same closing accounting period. 
 
 
5.4 Recommendations for Further Studies 
One of the recommendations that can be made is that, future researcher should 
study other sector to see the relationship between agency cost and corporate 
performance in Malaysia. This is due to the reason of future researchers can 
compare and evaluate the consistency of the result in this study which used 
manufacturing sector with other sectors.  
 
Further study in this area needs to include more independent variable to 
measured agency cost so that researcher can compare the consistency of the 
result with this study. This study also recommends that future researchers should 
use same accounting period for their data collection. This will make the result 
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         Appendix I 
Stationery Test for Leverage 
 
Null Hypothesis: LEVERAGE has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -11.63943  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.440197  
 5% level  -2.865776  
 10% level  -2.569083  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LEVERAGE)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/03/18   Time: 17:24   
Sample (adjusted): 2 650   
Included observations: 649 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LEVERAGE(-1) -0.347607 0.029865 -11.63943 0.0000 
C 0.110332 0.011091 9.948132 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.173138    Mean dependent var -0.000301 
Adjusted R-squared 0.171860    S.D. dependent var 0.159982 
S.E. of regression 0.145587    Akaike info criterion -1.013013 
Sum squared resid 13.71348    Schwarz criterion -0.999221 
Log likelihood 330.7226    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.007663 
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F-statistic 135.4763    Durbin-Watson stat 1.952261 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Stationary test for leverage with exogenous constant 
 
Above table shows that stationary test for leverage with exogenous constant. To 
accept null hypothesis which is leverage has a unit root or not stationary, the P 
value must more that 5% and t-Statistic value must less than test critical values at 
1%, 5% and 10% level. From the above table shows that P value is less than 5% 
which is 0% and t-Statistic value stand at 11.63943 which is more than test 
critical values at 1%, 5% and 10% level. This means that we cannot accept null 
hypothesis and the variable is stationery. 
Null Hypothesis: LEVERAGE has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -11.62948  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.972257  
 5% level  -3.416757  
 10% level  -3.130725  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LEVERAGE)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/03/18   Time: 18:40   
Sample (adjusted): 2 650   
Included observations: 649 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LEVERAGE(-1) -0.347618 0.029891 -11.62948 0.0000 
C 0.110085 0.014792 7.442257 0.0000 
@TREND("1") 7.74E-07 3.05E-05 0.025355 0.9798 
     
     R-squared 0.173139    Mean dependent var -0.000301 
Adjusted R-squared 0.170579    S.D. dependent var 0.159982 
S.E. of regression 0.145699    Akaike info criterion -1.009932 
Sum squared resid 13.71347    Schwarz criterion -0.989244 
Log likelihood 330.7230    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.001907 
F-statistic 67.63386    Durbin-Watson stat 1.952241 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Stationary test for leverage with exogenous constant and linear trend 
Above table shows that stationary test for variable leverage with exogenous 
constant and linear trend. Same result, the P value is less than 5% and t-Statistic 
value is more than test critical values at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Hence, the 
variable is stationery. 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: LEVERAGE has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 5 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.924979  0.0034 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.568558  
 5% level  -1.941315  
 10% level  -1.616369  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(LEVERAGE)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/03/18   Time: 19:08   
Sample (adjusted): 7 650   
Included observations: 644 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     LEVERAGE(-1) -0.050310 0.017200 -2.924979 0.0036 
D(LEVERAGE(-1)) -0.169625 0.039543 -4.289614 0.0000 
D(LEVERAGE(-2)) -0.156825 0.039611 -3.959134 0.0001 
D(LEVERAGE(-3)) -0.110600 0.039579 -2.794399 0.0054 
D(LEVERAGE(-4)) -0.108779 0.038963 -2.791842 0.0054 
D(LEVERAGE(-5)) -0.251608 0.038230 -6.581360 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.131339    Mean dependent var -0.000165 
Adjusted R-squared 0.124532    S.D. dependent var 0.160236 
S.E. of regression 0.149927    Akaike info criterion -0.948065 
Sum squared resid 14.34100    Schwarz criterion -0.906441 
Log likelihood 311.2771    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.931913 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.045275    
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Stationary test for leverage with exogenous none 
Above table shows that stationary test for variable leverage with exogenous 
none. Same result with exogenous constant and constant, linear trend, the P value 
which is stand at 0.0034 is less than 5% and t-Statistic value which is stand at 
2.924979 is more than test critical values at 1%, 5% and 10% level. Hence, we 
cannot accept null hypothesis and the variable is stationery. 
From three test above can be conclude that variable leverage is stationery. 
Appendix II 
Stationery Test for Size  
Null Hypothesis: SIZE has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 5 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.837200  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.440275  
 5% level  -2.865810  
 10% level  -2.569102  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SIZE)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/03/18   Time: 19:23   
Sample (adjusted): 7 650   
Included observations: 644 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SIZE(-1) -0.253819 0.032386 -7.837200 0.0000 
D(SIZE(-1)) 0.129217 0.040050 3.226360 0.0013 
D(SIZE(-2)) 0.073105 0.039904 1.832033 0.0674 
D(SIZE(-3)) 0.071111 0.039350 1.807126 0.0712 
D(SIZE(-4)) 0.097607 0.038793 2.516097 0.0121 
D(SIZE(-5)) -0.195556 0.038699 -5.053317 0.0000 
C 4.919971 0.627734 7.837673 0.0000 
75 
 
     
     R-squared 0.179515    Mean dependent var 0.004344 
Adjusted R-squared 0.171787    S.D. dependent var 0.733924 
S.E. of regression 0.667916    Akaike info criterion 2.041502 
Sum squared resid 284.1734    Schwarz criterion 2.090064 
Log likelihood -650.3637    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.060346 
F-statistic 23.22839    Durbin-Watson stat 1.977793 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Stationary test for size with exogenous constant  
Above table shows that stationary test for variable size with exogenous constant. 
The table shows that P value is less than 5% which is stand at 0 and t-Statistic 
value stand at 7.837200 which is more than test critical values at 1%, 5% and 
10% level. Hence, the variable is stationary. 
Null Hypothesis: SIZE has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 5 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.839067  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.972368  
 5% level  -3.416811  
 10% level  -3.130757  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SIZE)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/03/18   Time: 19:29   
Sample (adjusted): 7 650   
Included observations: 644 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SIZE(-1) -0.254533 0.032470 -7.839067 0.0000 
D(SIZE(-1)) 0.129591 0.040091 3.232389 0.0013 
D(SIZE(-2)) 0.073470 0.039944 1.839330 0.0663 
D(SIZE(-3)) 0.071459 0.039389 1.814190 0.0701 
D(SIZE(-4)) 0.097912 0.038829 2.521606 0.0119 
D(SIZE(-5)) -0.195223 0.038736 -5.039776 0.0000 
C 4.917141 0.628213 7.827187 0.0000 
@TREND("1") 5.09E-05 0.000142 0.358369 0.7202 
     
     R-squared 0.179681    Mean dependent var 0.004344 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.170652    S.D. dependent var 0.733924 
S.E. of regression 0.668374    Akaike info criterion 2.044406 
Sum squared resid 284.1161    Schwarz criterion 2.099905 
Log likelihood -650.2987    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.065942 
F-statistic 19.90116    Durbin-Watson stat 1.977554 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Stationary test for size with exogenous constant and linear trend 
Above table shows stationary test for variable size with exogenous constant and 
linear trend. The result show that with P value stand at 0% which is less than 5% 
and t-Statistic value stand at 7.839067 which is more than test critical values at 
1%, 5% and 10% level. Hence, the variable is stationary. 
Null Hypothesis: SIZE has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 10 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic  0.024652  0.6903 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.568586  
 5% level  -1.941319  
 10% level  -1.616366  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SIZE)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/03/18   Time: 19:52   
Sample (adjusted): 12 650   
Included observations: 639 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SIZE(-1) 3.42E-05 0.001386 0.024652 0.9803 
D(SIZE(-1)) -0.027581 0.038614 -0.714266 0.4753 
D(SIZE(-2)) -0.094398 0.038621 -2.444210 0.0148 
D(SIZE(-3)) -0.084211 0.038766 -2.172294 0.0302 
D(SIZE(-4)) -0.038672 0.038747 -0.998074 0.3186 
D(SIZE(-5)) -0.396577 0.038749 -10.23449 0.0000 
D(SIZE(-6)) -0.041009 0.038639 -1.061330 0.2889 
D(SIZE(-7)) -0.087286 0.038641 -2.258881 0.0242 
D(SIZE(-8)) -0.043830 0.038655 -1.133871 0.2573 
D(SIZE(-9)) -0.021486 0.038496 -0.558145 0.5769 
D(SIZE(-10)) -0.254319 0.038630 -6.583414 0.0000 
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R-squared 0.163563    Mean dependent var 0.003641 
Adjusted R-squared 0.150244    S.D. dependent var 0.736641 
S.E. of regression 0.679052    Akaike info criterion 2.080826 
Sum squared resid 289.5779    Schwarz criterion 2.157600 
Log likelihood -653.8239    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.110628 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.006012    
     
     
Stationary test for size with exogenous none 
Meanwhile, stationary test with exogenous none give a different result. As per 
table above show that P value stand at 0.6903 which is more than 5%. And t-
Statistic stand at 0.024652 which is less than test critical values at 1%, 5% and 
10%. This result shows that the null hypothesis cannot be reject which is variable 
size has a unit root. Hence, the variable is nonstationary with exogenous none. 
Two out of three test above show that variable size is stationery. Hence, can be 
















Stationery Test for Company Growth 
Null Hypothesis: COMPANY_GROWTH has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -25.45924  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.440197  
 5% level  -2.865776  
 10% level  -2.569083  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(COMPANY_GROWTH)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/03/18   Time: 19:59   
Sample (adjusted): 2 650   
Included observations: 649 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     COMPANY_GROWTH(-1) -1.000901 0.039314 -25.45924 0.0000 
C 0.119852 0.056886 2.106878 0.0355 
     
     R-squared 0.500453    Mean dependent var 8.03E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.499681    S.D. dependent var 2.041814 
S.E. of regression 1.444241    Akaike info criterion 3.576122 
Sum squared resid 1349.534    Schwarz criterion 3.589914 
Log likelihood -1158.452    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.581472 
F-statistic 648.1728    Durbin-Watson stat 2.000035 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Stationary test for company growth with exogenous constant  
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Table above shows that stationary test for variable company growth with 
exogenous constant. The table shows that P value stand at 0% which is less than 
5% and t-Statistic stand at 25.45924 which is more than test critical value at 1%, 
5% and 10%. Hence, the variable is stationary. 
 
Null Hypothesis: COMPANY_GROWTH has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -25.44328  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.972257  
 5% level  -3.416757  
 10% level  -3.130725  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(COMPANY_GROWTH)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/03/18   Time: 20:44   
Sample (adjusted): 2 650   
Included observations: 649 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     COMPANY_GROWTH(-1) -1.001053 0.039344 -25.44328 0.0000 
C 0.089590 0.113647 0.788316 0.4308 
@TREND("1") 9.32E-05 0.000303 0.307671 0.7584 
     
     R-squared 0.500526    Mean dependent var 8.03E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.498980    S.D. dependent var 2.041814 
S.E. of regression 1.445253    Akaike info criterion 3.579057 
Sum squared resid 1349.336    Schwarz criterion 3.599745 
Log likelihood -1158.404    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.587082 
F-statistic 323.6802    Durbin-Watson stat 2.000029 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Stationary test for company growth with exogenous constant and linear trend 
While, stationary test for variable company growth with exogenous constant and 
linear trend shows that P value also less than 5% which is stand at 0% and t-
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Statistic value stand at 25.44328 which is more than test critical value at 1%, 5% 





Null Hypothesis: COMPANY_GROWTH has a unit root 
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -25.30485  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.568530  
 5% level  -1.941312  
 10% level  -1.616371  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(COMPANY_GROWTH)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/04/18   Time: 18:41   
Sample (adjusted): 2 650   
Included observations: 649 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     COMPANY_GROWTH(-1) -0.994051 0.039283 -25.30485 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.497025    Mean dependent var 8.03E-05 
Adjusted R-squared 0.497025    S.D. dependent var 2.041814 
S.E. of regression 1.448069    Akaike info criterion 3.579878 
Sum squared resid 1358.793    Schwarz criterion 3.586774 
Log likelihood -1160.670    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.582553 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.999898    
     
     
Stationary test for company growth with exogenous none 
Above table shows that stationary test for variable company growth with 
exogenous none. The table show that the P value also less than 5% which is 
stand at 0% and t-Statistic value stand at 25.30485 which is more than test 
critical values at 1%, 5% and 10%. Hence, the variable is stationary. 
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Stationery Test for Expense 
Null Hypothesis: EXPENSE has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -19.46236  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.440197  
 5% level  -2.865776  
 10% level  -2.569083  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(EXPENSE)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/04/18   Time: 19:06   
Sample (adjusted): 2 650   
Included observations: 649 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     EXPENSE(-1) -0.739263 0.037984 -19.46236 0.0000 
C 0.163617 0.014389 11.37077 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.369263    Mean dependent var 0.000771 
Adjusted R-squared 0.368288    S.D. dependent var 0.375220 
S.E. of regression 0.298226    Akaike info criterion 0.421146 
Sum squared resid 57.54335    Schwarz criterion 0.434938 
Log likelihood -134.6619    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.426496 
F-statistic 378.7836    Durbin-Watson stat 2.050423 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Stationary test for expense with exogenous constant 
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From the table above shows that stationary test for variable expense with 
exogenous constant. The table shows that P value is less than 5% which is stand 
at 0% and t-Statistic stand at 19.46236 which is more than test critical values at 
1%, 5% and 10% level. Hence, the variable is stationary. 
 
Null Hypothesis: EXPENSE has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -19.47820  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.972257  
 5% level  -3.416757  
 10% level  -3.130725  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(EXPENSE)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/04/18   Time: 19:39   
Sample (adjusted): 2 650   
Included observations: 649 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     EXPENSE(-1) -0.740674 0.038026 -19.47820 0.0000 
C 0.146213 0.024618 5.939345 0.0000 
@TREND("1") 5.45E-05 6.26E-05 0.871352 0.3839 
     
     R-squared 0.370003    Mean dependent var 0.000771 
Adjusted R-squared 0.368053    S.D. dependent var 0.375220 
S.E. of regression 0.298281    Akaike info criterion 0.423053 
Sum squared resid 57.47579    Schwarz criterion 0.443741 
Log likelihood -134.2808    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.431078 
F-statistic 189.7010    Durbin-Watson stat 2.049731 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Stationary test for expense with exogenous constant and linear trend 
As per above table, stationary test for variable expense with exogenous constant 
and linear trend shows that P value stand at 0% which is less than 5% and t-
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Statistic value is more than test critical values at 1%, 5% and 10% which is 
19.47820. This shows that the variable is stationary. 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: EXPENSE has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 2 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -7.815334  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.568541  
 5% level  -1.941313  
 10% level  -1.616370  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(EXPENSE)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/04/18   Time: 20:10   
Sample (adjusted): 4 650   
Included observations: 647 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     EXPENSE(-1) -0.314709 0.040268 -7.815334 0.0000 
D(EXPENSE(-1)) -0.333539 0.045003 -7.411552 0.0000 
D(EXPENSE(-2)) -0.137536 0.039156 -3.512505 0.0005 
     
     R-squared 0.303066    Mean dependent var 0.000740 
Adjusted R-squared 0.300901    S.D. dependent var 0.375799 
S.E. of regression 0.314213    Akaike info criterion 0.527135 
Sum squared resid 63.58204    Schwarz criterion 0.547873 
Log likelihood -167.5283    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.535181 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.021754    
     
     
Stationary test for expense with exogenous none 
Table above shows that stationary test for variable expense with exogenous none. 
The P value is less than 5% which is 0% and t-Statistic stand at 7.815334 which 
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is more than test critical value at 1%, 5% and 10%. Hence, the variable expense 
is stationary. 
From the three test above can be conclude that variable expense is stationery. 
 
Appendix V 
Stationery Test for Efficiency 
Null Hypothesis: EFFICIENCY has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 5 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -8.358179  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.440275  
 5% level  -2.865810  
 10% level  -2.569102  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(EFFICIENCY)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/04/18   Time: 20:20   
Sample (adjusted): 7 650   
Included observations: 644 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     EFFICIENCY(-1) -0.345497 0.041336 -8.358179 0.0000 
D(EFFICIENCY(-1)) 0.095378 0.043636 2.185789 0.0292 
D(EFFICIENCY(-2)) 0.085223 0.042608 2.000165 0.0459 
D(EFFICIENCY(-3)) 0.062100 0.041145 1.509302 0.1317 
D(EFFICIENCY(-4)) 0.091514 0.039893 2.293978 0.0221 
D(EFFICIENCY(-5)) -0.202484 0.038774 -5.222118 0.0000 
C 0.334950 0.042182 7.940674 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.217511    Mean dependent var -0.000509 
Adjusted R-squared 0.210141    S.D. dependent var 0.365608 
S.E. of regression 0.324930    Akaike info criterion 0.600397 
Sum squared resid 67.25424    Schwarz criterion 0.648959 
Log likelihood -186.3280    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.619241 
F-statistic 29.51156    Durbin-Watson stat 1.994886 
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Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
Stationary test for efficiency with exogenous constant 
From the table above shows that stationary test for variable efficiency with 
exogenous constant. The table shows that P value is less than 5% which is 0% 
and t-Statistic stand at 19.46236 which is more than test critical values at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level. Hence, the variable is stationary. 
Null Hypothesis: EFFICIENCY has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant, Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 5 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -8.396166  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.972368  
 5% level  -3.416811  
 10% level  -3.130757  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(EFFICIENCY)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/04/18   Time: 23:13   
Sample (adjusted): 7 650   
Included observations: 644 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     EFFICIENCY(-1) -0.348116 0.041461 -8.396166 0.0000 
D(EFFICIENCY(-1)) 0.096772 0.043676 2.215649 0.0271 
D(EFFICIENCY(-2)) 0.086477 0.042643 2.027913 0.0430 
D(EFFICIENCY(-3)) 0.063350 0.041180 1.538356 0.1245 
D(EFFICIENCY(-4)) 0.092648 0.039925 2.320575 0.0206 
D(EFFICIENCY(-5)) -0.201411 0.038804 -5.190501 0.0000 
C 0.356640 0.049369 7.224021 0.0000 
@TREND("1") -5.85E-05 6.91E-05 -0.846098 0.3978 
     
     R-squared 0.218391    Mean dependent var -0.000509 
Adjusted R-squared 0.209789    S.D. dependent var 0.365608 
S.E. of regression 0.325003    Akaike info criterion 0.602378 
Sum squared resid 67.17862    Schwarz criterion 0.657877 
Log likelihood -185.9657    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.623914 
F-statistic 25.38661    Durbin-Watson stat 1.994702 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Stationary test for efficiency with exogenous constant and linear trend 
Table above shows that stationary test for variable efficiency with exogenous 
constant and linear trend. The table show that P value is less than 5% which is 
0% and t-Statistic stand at 8.396166 which is more than test critical values at 1%, 
5% and 10%. Hence, the variable is stationary. 
Null Hypothesis: EFFICIENCY has a unit root  
Exogenous: None   
Lag Length: 5 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=19) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.491378  0.0124 
Test critical values: 1% level  -2.568558  
 5% level  -1.941315  
 10% level  -1.616369  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(EFFICIENCY)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/04/18   Time: 23:17   
Sample (adjusted): 7 650   
Included observations: 644 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     EFFICIENCY(-1) -0.032746 0.013144 -2.491378 0.0130 
D(EFFICIENCY(-1)) -0.097479 0.037974 -2.566990 0.0105 
D(EFFICIENCY(-2)) -0.091566 0.038055 -2.406165 0.0164 
D(EFFICIENCY(-3)) -0.094329 0.037838 -2.492967 0.0129 
D(EFFICIENCY(-4)) -0.044994 0.037709 -1.193174 0.2332 
D(EFFICIENCY(-5)) -0.323041 0.037373 -8.643664 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.140056    Mean dependent var -0.000509 
Adjusted R-squared 0.133316    S.D. dependent var 0.365608 
S.E. of regression 0.340366    Akaike info criterion 0.691680 
Sum squared resid 73.91149    Schwarz criterion 0.733305 
Log likelihood -216.7210    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.707832 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.052885    
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Above table shows that stationary test for variable efficiency with exogenous 
none. The table shows that P value is less than 5% which is 1.24% and t-Statistic 
is more than test critical value at 5% and 10%. Hence, the variable is stationary. 
From the three test above can be conclude that variable efficiency is stationery. 
